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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Why a State-Level Carbon Tax Can Include Border Adjustments
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Introduction
This is our third in a series of articles considering 
taxation and greenhouse gas mitigation. To date, all 
state-level attempts to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions by placing a price on carbon have involved 
cap-and-trade regimes. In our previous two articles,1 
we considered how importing tax features into a cap-
and-trade regime could ease distributive concerns and 
also make cap-and-trade regimes more efficient.
As we noted in our first article, the general 
consensus among economists and other commentators 
is that a carbon tax would (theoretically) be superior to 
a cap-and-trade regime. However, there is also a 
general consensus that a single state cannot 
(practically) impose a significant carbon tax because a 
single state cannot impose border tax adjustments.
Border tax adjustments are crucial because a 
carbon tax in one state would make products in that 
state more expensive, particularly energy-intensive 
products such as concrete. Thus, if consumers or 
businesses could just import those products from other 
states, a carbon tax in one state would accomplish little 
except to harm that state’s domestic industries.
That problem could be solved if a state could 
impose a surcharge on out-of-state imports to make up 
for the tax on domestic producers. But the general 
consensus is that this sort of surcharge would clearly 
violate the Constitution’s dormant commerce clause, 
effectively taking that solution off the table.
Nevertheless, in this article and in the one that 
follows, we will argue against that general consensus.2 
Specifically, we will explain how a well-designed state-
level carbon tax with border tax adjustments could 
pass constitutional muster.
To be sure, this is both the worst of times and the 
best of times for a state to consider imposing a carbon 
tax. It is the worst of times because there is little 
prospect that a successful state carbon tax might, once 
so proven, then soon be adopted at the national level. 
Indeed, there is unlikely to be much — if any — 
pressure on the states to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions from the federal government.
Yet it is also the best of times because the likely 
absence of federal action makes state action more 
important, both substantively and symbolically. In 
other words, because the federal government will not 
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policy to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. They 
argue for state-level carbon taxes with border tax 
adjustments — an argument that goes against the 
general consensus that such a move would violate 
the dormant commerce clause.
1David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Using Taxes to 
Improve Cap and Trade, Part I: Distribution,” State Tax Notes, 
Jan. 12, 2015, p. 99; and Gamage and Shanske, “Using Taxes to 
Improve Cap and Trade, Part II: Efficient Pricing,” State Tax 
Notes, Sept. 5, 2016, p. 807.
2Many of the arguments in this article first appeared in 
Shanske, “State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Can Formulary Apportionment Save the 
World?” 18 Chapman L. Rev. 191 (2014).
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be riding to the rescue anytime soon, we must hope 
that the states’ laboratories of democracy are up to the 
task of saving the world.
And there is some reason to be hopeful that 
subnational action could be significant. It appears that 
the United States is on track to meet its pledges under 
the Paris Agreement, even though the centerpiece of 
former President Obama’s mitigation strategy, the 
Clean Power Plan, has been held up in the courts and is 
now unlikely, to put it mildly, to be a priority for the 
Trump administration.3 How can that be so? One 
reason is that the natural gas revolution has made coal 
less cost effective. Another reason is that state 
regulatory mandates have increased the use of 
renewable energy.4
Carbon taxes pose numerous design issues.5 For 
instance, should the tax be structured as a payment 
made by consumers, as with retail sales taxes?6 Or 
should the tax be structured as a levy imposed at 
specific carbon-intensive choke points? We will mostly 
abstract from those sorts of design issues in this article. 
We will focus instead on analyzing whether the U.S. 
Constitution, and in particular the judicially crafted 
dormant commerce clause, prevents a state from 
imposing border adjustments as part of a carbon tax.7 
We will argue that there are several routes by which a 
properly designed carbon tax with border adjustments 
might pass muster.8
Outline of a Carbon Tax
Although we will not be writing about the details 
of carbon tax design, it is helpful to outline at least a 
reasonable design of a carbon tax to set up our analysis. 
Our outline here will roughly follow the carbon tax 
design proposed by Gilbert Metcalf and David 
Weisbach.
Most of the greenhouse gas produced in the United 
States is produced by fossil fuels.9 Fossil fuel 
production occurs via numerous chokepoints, such as 
refineries, of which there are under 200 in the United 
States.10 So, for simplicity, let us suppose that a state 
were to impose a $20-per-metric-ton tax on carbon, 
collected at refineries.11
That new tax would make exports from the taxing 
state more expensive and imports to the state cheaper. 
To illustrate, let us focus on a different concrete 
example — concrete.12 The process of concrete 
production produces carbon over and above the energy 
that the production of concrete requires.13 There are 
only a small number of concrete plants in the United 
States, and thus concrete plants are a plausible point at 
which a carbon tax might be imposed.
To be more specific, suppose that Oregon were to 
impose a carbon tax of that sort. Without border tax 
adjustments, Oregon would thereby significantly 
disadvantage its domestic concrete producers — not 3Eduardo Porter, “Earth Isn’t Doomed Yet. The Climate 
Could Survive Trump Policies,” The New York Times, Nov. 30, 
2016, at B1.
4Id. and Michael Grunwald, “Environmentalists Get a Dose 
of Good News,” Politico, Nov. 18, 2016, available at http://
politi.co/2g3ziq9.
5Strictly speaking, carbon dioxide is only one form of 
greenhouse gas — that is, it is only one kind of the type of gas 
implicated in causing global warming. As will be noted below, 
we will not assume that the carbon tax imposed by a state 
would be only on carbon. However, we will follow Gilbert E. 
Metcalf and David Weisbach by labeling that tax a carbon tax 
even if it applies to other gases as well. Metcalf and Weisbach, 
“The Design of a Carbon Tax,” 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 499, 500 
(2009). The tax in British Columbia, for example, is assessed 
only on carbon. David G. Duff, “Carbon Taxation in British 
Columbia,” 10 Vt. J. Int’l L. 87, 93-94 (2008).
6See Dan Farber, “The Possible Merits of a Hybrid Sales Plus 
Carbon Tax,” Legal Planet (Oct. 9, 2012).
7Any border adjustments would have to be imprecise, but 
the Supreme Court has been miserly about permitting an 
approximately compensating tax to fall on imports to a state. 
Steven Ferrey, “Goblets of Fire: Potentially Constitutional 
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming,” 35 Ecology 
L.Q. 835, 880-81 (2008) (doubting complementary tax doctrine 
can save border adjustments), but see William Funk, 
“Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade 
Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
as a Case in Point,” 27 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 353, 366-68 
(2009) (slightly more optimistic analysis).
8Border adjustments imposed by a state would also likely 
raise issues regarding international trade. Those issues will also 
be beyond the scope of this article, though at least some 
commentators plausibly see the issues as largely analogous and 
thus perhaps a solution within the U.S. federal system might 
suggest an answer internationally. Gergen supra; see also 
generally Carol McAusland and Nouri Najjar, Carbon Footprint 
Taxes, Section 5 (detailed discussion of WTO issues). Or 
perhaps not. Indeed, if state border tax adjustments did cause 
sufficient problems for the United States, they might be struck 
down domestically as running afoul of the foreign dormant 
commerce clause. Japan Lines v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 
434 (1979).
9Metcalf and Weisbach, supra note 5, at 522.
10Id. at 523.
11Note that according to the California Air Services Board’s 
“Summary of Joint Action Settlement Prices and Results,” the 
current price on the California exchange is $12.73. The oft-
quoted central estimate for the social cost of carbon will be $42 
in 2020, according to the EPA fact sheet, Social Cost of Carbon.“
12With apologies for our bad attempts at punniness!
13Id. at 529-30 (”The emissions stem from the production of 
clinker, an intermediate product, which is a combination of 
lime and silica-containing materials. According to EPA, CO2 
emissions from production are directly proportional to the lime 
content of the clinker”).
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only in the export market but also in the state.14 This 
disadvantage would manifest even if Oregon concrete 
producers generated less greenhouse gases per unit of 
concrete production than their out-of-state 
competitors.15
That economic problem is both an environmental 
problem and a political problem. Obviously, if more 
expensive Oregon concrete is replaced by cheaper out-
of-state concrete that is made even cheaper because of 
a lack of a carbon tax, the carbon tax will hurt Oregon 
business and not reduce net carbon emissions. That 
problem is called leakage. Naturally, the prospect of 
economic harm suffered for no environmental gain is 
likely to hurt the political prospects of any such reform 
right from the start.
The direct fix for leakage is to credit the Oregon 
producer for all the concrete that it is exporting and to 
impose an equivalent tax on imports of concrete. In that 
case, it is perhaps easy enough for Oregon to estimate 
the carbon tax it has imposed on the concrete and to 
strip it out, and also to add that cost to imports. The 
Oregon concrete producer would then be charged a 
per-unit tax on its concrete but would also get a refund 
for the concrete it exported. A concrete importer would 
then need to pay the same per unit cost when it imports 
concrete.16
With that setup, we can now ask whether, seeing as 
the tax described above would be specifically on 
imports, would that tax not be a facial discrimination 
under federal dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence? That is our first doctrinal question.
Then, assuming Oregon is to use border tax 
adjustments, it will also need to use approximations 
based on the origin of goods and services. That is, it is 
likely cheaper to produce concrete in a state that has 
cheaper — but (let us suppose) more carbon-intensive 
— power sources. Assuming that Oregon could impose 
some type of border adjustment, could it impose one 
that ultimately takes into account the origin of a good 
or service? That is our second question.
To further illustrate this question, let’s return to our 
Oregon concrete producer and suppose it is paying 1X 
per unit in carbon taxes. Under those adjustments, an 
out-of-state importer may need to pay 1.2X per unit — 
or perhaps 0.9X — depending on the origin of the 
concrete. As for out-of-state producers paying more, 
that seems to be an even more blatant facial 
discrimination.
Finally, our third question has to do with how 
carbon intensity is being measured, as surely it is just 
an approximation. That is, how much imprecision, if 
any, is permissible?
So, to summarize, those are the three doctrinal 
questions posed by border adjustments: (1) Can there 
be any special tax at all on imports, even if it is the same 
as a tax on domestic production? (2) Could a state 
differentiate its border adjustments between products 
based on approximations of their carbon intensity, if 
such approximations take geography into account? (3) 
Even if the answers to questions 1 and 2 are yes, how 
much approximation is permissible?
Prima Facie Answers: 
Border Adjustments Are Doomed
The U.S. Supreme Court imposes an almost per se 
rule of invalidity about taxes that discriminate between 
in-state and out-of-state taxpayers.17 Thus, the answer 
to the second question, about applying different rates 
to products based on the different carbon footprints of 
different states or regions, seems very likely to be no. 
That answer would then seem to be the end of the story, 
whatever the answers to the other questions.18
Indeed, out-of-state producers seem necessarily to 
be at a disadvantage to the extent that the border 
adjustment takes into account the additional carbon 
burned in transporting a product.
As to the first and third questions — can there be a 
special import charge and how much imprecision is 
permissible — the Court has tolerated special taxes on 
imports (the use tax) only when they precisely matched 
up with a tax on domestic consumption (the sales 
tax).19 Because assessing the carbon intensity of both 
14Compare Jenny H. Liu and Jeff Renfro, “Carbon Tax and 
Shift: How to Make It Work for Oregon’s Economy,” Northwest 
Economic Research Center Report 15 (2013), identifying the 
problem.
15Metcalf and Weisbach, supra note 5, at 540-541. Note also 
that a whole other issue is raised if the other state (or nation) is 
trying to control carbon emissions but in a manner not directly 
comparable — for example, California’s cap-and-trade system. 
We will leave those questions to the side for the moment, 
though note that the same basic analysis should apply should 
one state try to unilaterally adjust its regime to cope with the 
different carbon prices set by other jurisdictions (for example, 
using an adjustable credit).
16This is an easy example; how would one strip out the 
carbon tax from in-state services? That’s why it is important to 
apply the tax at just a few points in which that kind of 
calculation is at least roughly possible.
17See, e.g., United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330, 338-39 (2007).
18See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 
F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of 
hearing en banc); see also Joseph Allan MacDougald, “Why 
Climate Law Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas Trading 
Systems,” 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1431, 1435 (2008) (similar analysis).
19See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) 
(Cardozo, J.).
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domestic and imported products will be the product of 
informed guesswork, it seems such a practice would 
not pass muster, either.20 Thus, the answer to the third 
question is also likely no.
Our First Counterargument: 
No Facial Discrimination Exists
In analyzing whether border tax adjustments 
might be permissible, we first consider a recent 
dormant commerce clause case about carbon 
regulation — an important case that has received 
surprisingly little attention from state tax 
practitioners.21
As part of its implementation of A.B. 32, 
California’s cap-and-trade regime, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) adopted a low carbon fuel 
standard. That standard sets an annual limit on the 
carbon intensity of fuels, and blenders of fuels over the 
limit must purchase credits from blenders below the 
limit. To assess how a particular fuel did relative to the 
standard, the CARB had to develop a complicated 
metric that differentiated among fuels by region. The 
rationale for differentiating among regions was that 
there were differences in the carbon intensity of fuels 
produced in different places. If California wanted its 
system to actually reduce carbon, it had to rely on those 
metrics.
A federal district court struck down the California 
fuel standard. Among other reasons, and the key 
reason for our purposes, the court found that taking 
into account the source of fuels was a facial 
discrimination that failed strict scrutiny.22 
Nevertheless, a Ninth Circuit panel overturned the 
district court by a 2-1 vote.23 The full Ninth Circuit then 
refused to hear the case en banc.24
As to the facial discrimination argument, the 
court’s majority reasoned that there was no facial 
discrimination, because the California regulations were 
not targeting out-of-state producers because they were 
out of state; instead, the regulations were motivated by 
and based on an entirely different concern — namely, 
measuring carbon intensity.25 Sometimes in-state 
producers did better by that metric and sometimes 
not.26 California was not basing its regulations on state 
borders.
Interestingly, though that was not formally a tax 
case, the decision revolved around several key 
dormant commerce clause tax cases.27 Conceptually, 
that makes sense because, as we have argued before, 
regulations and taxes are often policy substitutes.28 
Accordingly, although Supreme Court cases sometimes 
seem to apply a different test to taxes versus 
regulations, we know of no case in which the Court 
said that there are different rules or justified there 
being different rules.29 In any event, the Ninth Circuit, 
in interpreting lead tax cases, seems to outline a 
promising strategy for defending a carbon tax with 
border adjustments, should it be properly designed 
from the start. Specifically, the carbon intensity 
framework should apply to all products and services. 
So long as the regulatory structure is sufficiently 
rigorous and based on factors other than jurisdictional 
lines, it should pass muster even if some inputs take 
geography into account.
Another important feature of the California 
regulation is worth noting. The fuel standard generally 
works by setting defaults and then allowing firms to 
argue for individualized determinations.30 Thus, the 
majority opinion noted that any mischief caused by the 
general formulas — including to out-of-state producers 
— could be corrected.31 The dissent did not believe that 
those individualized determinations went far 
enough.32 It is unclear how important that issue 
ultimately was to the majority’s reasoning, but 
20See Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 
644 (1994).
21We found only one mention in State Tax Notes, in a column 
by Patrick Dowdall. His general conclusions track ours. Patrick 
Dowdall, ” Green Incentives and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause,” State Tax Notes, Jan. 4, 2016, p. 41.
22Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 2011 WL 
6936368 (E.D.Cal. Dec 29, 2011).
23Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2013). Notably, the panel only overturned the case about 
the facial constitutional challenge to the fuel standard, and thus 
the standard may still be found wanting after a fact-intensive 
analysis. That point was emphasized by the author of the Ninth 
Circuit decision in his concurrence to the denial of the hearing 
en banc. 740 F.3d at 510 (Gould, J., concurring).
24740 F.3d 507.
25Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089 (”The Fuel Standard 
does not base its treatment on a fuel’s origin but on its carbon 
intensity. The Fuel Standard performs lifecycle analysis to 
measure the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways”). The dissent 
disagreed with that characterization of the fuel standard. Rocky 
Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1108 (Murguia, J. dissenting). This factual 
dispute might be decisive in this case, but the doctrinal 
argument would still stand that if a regulation truly did not 
base itself on geography, it would not count as a facial 
discrimination.
26Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1083-1084 (California ethanol 
producers pay more because they import Midwestern corn).
27See, e.g., Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1089 (distinguishing 
Oregon Waste).
28Gamage and Shanske, “On Tax Increase Limitations: Part 
I — A Costly Incoherence,” State Tax Notes, Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813.
29See discussion here: Gamage and Shanske, “The Saga of 
State ‘Amazon’ Laws: Reflections on the Colorado Decision,” 
State Tax Notes, July 16, 2012, p. 197.
30Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082.
31Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1094; 740 F.3d at 510 (Gould, 
J., concurring).
32Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., dissenting).
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permitting individual firms to challenge a default 
seems to be a prudent feature should one wish to 
design a system that would be upheld under the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning.33
Conclusion
We will explore additional doctrinal routes for 
justifying well-designed border adjustments in our 
next article in this series.34 For now, we conclude this 
article by summarizing the theoretical reason why 
border adjustments in the context of a subnational 
carbon tax should not be struck down as per se 
discrimination. A carbon tax is a tax on an externality, 
but, because of leakage, the tax cannot succeed without 
border adjustments. The courts have not considered a 
tax like that, but we contend that current doctrine 
points to a sensible way forward if a state chooses to 
pursue it. 
33By analogy, Gamage and Hicklin have argued that a 
similar scheme — of a reasonable default that can be overcome 
— should allow states to require remote vendors to collect use 
taxes. David Gamage and Devin J. Heckman, “A Better Way 
Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce,” 92 B.U. L. Rev. 483 
(2012).
34If you just can’t wait, see Shanske, supra note 2, for a 
preview.
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